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THE THREE FACES OF ZAPATA: MARITIME LAW,
FEDERAL COMMON LAW, FEDERAL COURTS LAW
Harold G. Maier*
In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,' the Supreme Court upheld
the selection of a London forum in a towage contract between a
German firm and an American firm and dismissed a suit brought in a
Florida federal district court whose jurisdiction was otherwise valid. In
doing so, the Court stated the rule: "[Forum-selection clauses] are
prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown
by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circumstances." 2
The Court qualified the rule by indicating that to be enforceable such
clauses must be actually bargained for and agreed to by the parties and
that an unjust or arbitrary designation of forum would not be
acceptable.3 This comment deals with three potential applications of
the Zapata decision in order to indicate its implications for the
enforceability of forum-selection clauses in American courts. The
potential scope of Zapata's rule depends on, first, the source and
scope of the Supreme Court's power to create and apply its rule for all
admiralty and maritime cases; secondly, the extent to which the
Court's decision creates supreme federal common law, making forumselection clauses at least prima facie valid in all cases involving
international contracts; and, thirdly, the extent to which the decision
has validated forum-selection clauses in all cases, domestic or
international, in which such contract provisions are sought to be
enforced. In order to clarify the legal considerations involved in
dealing with these problems, this comment begins with a brief survey
of the authority for, and scope of, the power of the federal courts to
fashion rules of federal common law.
Since the landmark decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,4 it has been
clear that there is no separate body of federal common law, existing
outside the aegis of any particular state, that would control the
substantive results of decisions in federal forums. The decision in Erie,
however, was clearly not intended to deny the existence of power in
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the federal courts to create law by common law techniques for use in
special types of situations in which an important federal interest
indicates the need for the exercise of judicial law-making power. Erie
did reject the concept of a special "federal courts common law" but it
did so only in the sense that it overruled Swift v. Tyson,' which had
created a kind of "common law" applicable only in the federal courts,
and especially for diversity cases. 6
The power to use common law techniques to create national legal
rules by judicial decision is clearly part of the federal "judicial power"
given to the courts in article III of the United States Constitution.'
There are at least four different types of cases in which this common
law power is regularly exercised by the federal courts.' The first type
includes those cases in which the courts develop substantive rules to
determine disputes between the states, or between the states and the
nation. Illustrative of this type of case is Hinderliderv. La Plata River
& Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,9 in which the Supreme Court applied

principles derived from public international law and from the
assumptions underlying the United States Constitution to determine
the rules that would govern the apportionment between two states of
waters in an interstate stream. The second class of cases includes those
situations in which the court must determine the correct division of
powers between the branches of the national government, not from an
explicit constitutional command, but from principles derived by
drawing the necessary inferences from the structure of a national
government of separated powers. Illustrative of this type are most of
those cases that include issues designated as "political questions," such
as Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino" concerning the act of state

doctrine, or Ex parte Peru" concerning the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. A third class of cases includes those in which the court
finds limitations on the power of the states based on, but not

5. 41 U.S. 1 (1842).
6. Cheatham, Conflict of Laws: Some Developments and Some Questions, 25
ARK. L. REV. 9, 30-33 (1971). See also Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 383,405 (1964).
7. See Cheatham & Maier, Private International Law and Its Sources, 22
VAND. L. REV. 27,58 (1968).

8. For a different and more detailed division of these cases see Hill, The
Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).
9. 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
10. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
11. 318 U.S. 578 (1943). See Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30
(1945).
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explicitly compelled by, the constitutional division of powers between
the states and the nation. Illustrative of cases of this type is Zschernig
v. Miller12 in which the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the
application of a state statute preventing foreign heirs from inheriting a
decedent's estate unless the heirs could prove that their nation would
grant reciprocal treatment to Americans and that they would have the
benefit and use of the funds passed. In this case, the majority
structured its rule on a finding of an impermissible interference by the
state with the national foreign relations power, although the decision
is more properly characterized as being based on "the basic allocation
of power between the States and the Nation" in matters touching
foreign affairs. 1 3 The Sabbatino case drew a similar conclusion when
that the act of state doctrine is one of federal, not state,
it ruled
14
law.
The fourth class of federal common law cases includes those in
which the courts derive by common law techniques a rule of decision
applicable to actions involving private individuals because of special
federal interest in the content of the substantive rule that is to govern
rights of the parties. The clearest illustrations of cases of this type are
found in admiralty and maritime law.' The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co. is one of these cases.
There is, today, no doubt of the Court's power to create substantive rules that are applicable in all maritime cases. 6 Such
power stems directly from the assignment of federal jurisdiction under article III of the Constitution in "all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." This clause has long been
interpreted to permit the federal courts to create supreme federal
common law in cases of this type.' Even if the admiralty clause in
the Constitution is viewed merely as a grant of jurisdiction,' 8 without
the necessary implication of judicial law-making power, the determination of when that jurisdiction should not be exercised is surely within

12.
13.
14.
Range

389 U.S. 429 (1968).
389 U.S. at 443 (Stewart, J., concurring).
For a discussion of this aspect of these two cases see Maier, The Bases and
of Federal Common Law in Private InternationalMatters, 5 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 133, 13641, 159-62 (1971).
15. For an excellent discussion of the entire area of federal control of
maritime matters see Note, The Bases and Range of FederalMaritime Law: Indicia
of Maritime Competence, 6 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 187 (1972).
16. See Hill, supra note 8, at 1032-35.
17. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). For a more recent
illustration see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
18. See Hill, supra note 8, at 1032-33.
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the power of the court to which it is granted. Thus even if the forum
selection clause is treated as an attempt to "oust" jurisdiction, rather
than as a part of the contract to be interpreted and enforced, the
authority for the Zapata holding is clear." The Court made explicit
its intent that the rule is henceforth to be applied by all federal courts
sitting in admiralty, at least when such cases involve a foreign party,
and it implies that the rule is intended to govern purely domestic
maritime cases as well, as long as the enforcemnt of the clause would
not "contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is
brought, whether declared by statute or by judicial decision." 2
A second and slightly more difficult question concerns the extent
of the power of the federal courts to validate, by a federal common
law rule, forum-selection clauses in all international contracts,
regardless of the domestic forum in which they are sought to be
enforced. Further, if that power exists, has the Supreme Court in
Zapata exercised it? The answer to each of these questions is in the
affirmative.
The existence of a general power in the federal courts to create
substantive rules for cases in which there is a special national interest
in the rule's content has been to some degree obscured by the
tendency of the courts to justify decisions of this type, not in terms of
existing federal judicial power to function as common law courts
where appropriate, but rather by reference to either statutory or
constitutional texts in which the courts allegedly "find" the rule to be
applied.2 1 ' Illustrative of this type of reasoning is D'oench, Duhme &
Co. v. FDIC.2 2" ' In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that the
applicability of the doctrine of holder in due course to notes held
against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation would be deter-

19. In Zapata, the Court emphasized that it was not concerned merely with a
matter of federal jurisdiction. The Court said that enforcement of the forum
selection clause did not "oust" federal jurisdiction, but that its enforcement
represented an exercise of jurisdiction to give effect to the intentions of the
parties "manifested in their freely negotiated agreement. . . ." 407 U.S. at 12.
20. 407 U.S. at 15. One form that this public policy might take is represented
by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303 (8) (1970). See, e.g.,
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955); Indussa Corp. v. S.S.
Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
21. This same tendency exists in cases involving certain kinds of constitutional
questions in which the courts tend to seek explicit textual justifications for
decisions that are more accurately explained by structural analysis of governmental interrelationships. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
22. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
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mined by federal, not state, law. The majority of the Court found, in
the Federal Reserve Act, "[a] federal policy to protect respondent
[FDIC], and the public funds which it administers, against misrepresentations as to the securities or other assets in the portfolios of the
banks which respondent insures or to which it makes loans." 2 3 That
this statutory justification was not only spurious but unnecessary was
pointed out by Mr. Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion. He
argued that the Court's decision was not merely one in which it
stretched the Federal Reserve Act to find an applicable federal rule.
Rather, the decision was an open exercise of the power to make
federal common law.
I think we should attempt a more explicit answer to the question whether
federal or state law governs our decision .... I do not understand Justice
Brandeis's statement in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins ... that " [t ]here is no
federal general common law," to deny that the common law may in proper
cases be an aid to, or the basis of, decision of federal questions .... Were we
bereft of the common law, our federal system would be impotent. This
follows from the recognized futility of attempting all-complete statutory
codes.... Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and
statutes, and is conditioned by them. Within these limits, federal courts are
free to apply the traditional common-law technique... in cases such as the
present .... The law which we apply to this case consists of principles of
established credit in jurisprudence, selected by us because they are
appropriate to effectuate the policy of the governing Act.24
There are several other cases in which the courts purport to find
justification for judicially created substantive law in federal statutes
but in which the statutory connection is so tenuous that the decisions
can be explained only by treating them as the results of law making by
common law techniques. A recent case of this kind is Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co.2" In that case, a New
York company had purchased a business from a New Jersey company.
The contract of sale required continuing assistance in marketing and
quality control by the seller for a designated period as part of the
consideration for the purchase price. The agreement contained a
clause in which the parties agreed to submit all disputes under the
contract to arbiters from the American Arbitration Association. After
the purchase had been completed, the New York plaintiff discovered
that the New Jersey seller was unable financially to carry out its

23.
24.
25.
26.

315 U.S. at 457.
315 U.S. at 465-72. (Jackson, J., concurring).
388 U.S. 395 (1967).
9 U.S.C. § § 1-14 (1970).
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responsibilities under the contract. In addition, there was evidence
that this weak financial condition had been known to the seller before
the contract was signed. The New York company refused to pay
further installments of the purchase price under the contract and the
New Jersey seller sought arbitration in New York. The New York
company refused to arbitrate and brought a diversity suit in a federal
court sitting in New York to have the contract declared void for fraud.
The seller argued that the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction
because there was no allegation of fraud concerning the arbitration
clause and because the clause was separable from the remainder of the
contract. After the plaintiff's suit was dismissed below, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The Court purportedly applied section 2 of
the United States Arbitration Act,26 which provides that a written
arbitration agreement "in any ... contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." The Court ruled that the arbitration clause was
separable from the remainder of the contract and that, therefore, the
issue of fraud in the inducement was not raised. Since the clause was
therefore independently valid, enforcement was required by the
provision of the Arbitration Act. The Court expressly rejected New
York law as a source for determining the separability of the
arbitration clause from the remainder of the contract. The Court
purported to find in the legislative history of the section of the Act in
question an indication that an arbitration clause was to be enforced
unless there was an allegation of fraud in the inducement relating to
the arbitration clause itself." In fact, the Court created its own
federal rule to determine the separability of the arbitration clause,
even though it assumed that the clause was not separable under the
New York Arbitration Act.2 8 Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, made it
clear that the majority was in fact exercising power to create a
"national rule" governing separability in contracts to arbitrate. The
only supportable basis for this decision is not the language of the
statute itself, or even congressional intent attached to any specific
language. Rather, the Court appears to have used as the fundamental
source of its rule the principle that there is a federal interest in the
enforcement of contracts to arbitrate and that the implementation of
this federal interest should not be left to state law.
Despite apparent preoccupation with statutory sources, even for
what are clearly common law implementations of general policy
27. 388 U.S. at 403-04.

28. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAWS AND RULES §'7503 (McKinney 1963).
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considerations, the Supreme Court has made it clear that it has no
doubt of its own power to create federal common law in cases in
which a federal interest must be reflected in the substantive rule. In
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,2 9 the United States sued on a
guarantee by defendant bank to recover the amount of a check on
which the payee's name had been forged. The check had been drawn
against the United States Treasury in payment for work done under
the Works Progress Administration. The District Court held that a
fifteen-month delay in giving notice of the forgery to defendant was
an unreasonable delay under Pennsylvania law, where the case was
being tried. The Supreme Court ruled that federal law, not state law,
governed the rights and obligations of the United States on its own
commercial paper. Justice Douglas wrote:
The authority to issue the check had its origin in the Constitution and the
statutes of the United States and was in no way dependent on the laws of
Pennsylvania or of any other state.... The duties imposed upon the United
States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their
roots in the same federal sources ....

In absence of an applicable Act of

Congress it is for the federal courts
to fashion the governing rule of law
30
according to their own standards.
The Court went on to note that a principal reason for creating the
federal common law rule that it applied was the need for nationally
uniform
results not subject to "the vagaries of the laws of the several
,31
states.

The opinion in Zapata makes it clear that the operative legal
policies supporting the rule applied were federal in origin32 and that
this justifies the creation of federal common law applicable not only
to maritime matters, but to international contracts generally. The
rationale stated by the Court goes far beyond that required to justify
its decision regarding maritime matters alone. The Court wrote:
For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas
commercial activities by business enterprises based in the United States. The
barrier of distance that once tended to confine a business concern to
a modest territory no longer does so ....

The expansion of American

business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved
under our laws and in our courts .... We cannot have trade and commerce
29. 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
30. 318 U.S. at 366.
31. 318 U.S. at 367.
32. See Freund, Federal-StateRelations in the Opinions of Judge Magruder,
72 HARV. L. REV. 1204, 1213 (1959).
Vol. 6-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

in world markets and international waters 33
exclusively on our terms,
governed by our laws and resolved in our courts.
Later in the opinion, the Court pointed out other adverse effects that
refusal to enforce the selection clause would have in international
dealings and relations.
[F]oreign businessmen prefer, as do we, to have disputes resolved in their
own courts, but if that choice is not available, then a neutral forum with
expertise in the subject matter.... The argument that such clauses are
improper because they tend to 'oust' a court of jurisdiction is hardly more
than a vestigial legal fiction. It appears to rest at core on historical judicial
resistance to any attempt to reduce the power and business of a particular
court and has little place in an era when all courts are overloaded and when
businesses once essentially local now operate in world markets. It reflects
something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals. 34
This last statement echoes a continuing theme in American case law
concerning the national importance of maintaining an effective
climate in which to conduct international commercial activity. In
Lauritzen v. Larsen,35 Justice Jackson warned against the dangers of
forgetting that American foreign commerce is in fact international and
that undue judicial emphasis on domestic values could have seriously
harmful effects.
[I] n dealing with international commerce we cannot be unmindful of the
necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided; nor should
we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application
of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong6 a warrant for a
foreign country to apply its law to an American transaction.
The importance to a nation of certainty and predictability in
international commercial contracts is recognized in all countries
engaged in international economic intercourse. In this connection, two
cases decided during the 1960's by the French Cour de Cassation have
considerable relevance."
In the first case, Office National Interprofessionnel des Cereales c. Capitaine du San Carlo, the court ruled
that an arbitration clause in a contract between a French government33. 407 U.S. at 8-9.
34. 407 U.S. at 12.
35. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
36. 345 U.S. at 582.
37. The two cases, decided in 1964 and 1966 respectively, together with
citations to the French reports, are described in detail in Batiffol, Arbitration
Clauses Concluded between French Government-Owned Enterprisesand Foreign
PrivateParties,7 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 32 (1968).
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owned enterprise and a private party for transport of grain from
Ethiopia to Marseilles prevented a French court from entertaining a
suit by the government entity for damages resulting from loss of the
cargo. The contract designated Genoa as the situs for any arbitration.
In this case, the court reasoned that since the contract was made in
England, enforceability of the clause was to be determined according
to English law under which it was valid and binding. In the second
case, Tresor Public c. Galakis, the Cour de Cassation ruled that a
government-owned enterprise could not refuse to participate in
binding arbitration to which it had agreed concerning violation of the
provisions of a charter party and that the award of the London
arbitral tribunal, before which the French enterprise had refused to
appear, was binding and enforceable in French courts. In upholding
the decision of the lower court giving effect to the arbitral award, the
Cour de Cassationruled that those sections of the French Civil Code
that invalidated arbitration agreements entered into by French
government agencies were inapplicable to defeat an agreement to
arbitrate in an international contract. The court wrote:
[T] he primary duty of the Court of Appeal was to decide whether the rule,
enacted for internal contracts, should be applied as well to international
contracts made to suit the needs of, and under the conditions conforming to
the usages of, maritime commerce; that the judgment under attack decides
38
justly that the rule denying validity does not apply to such a contract.
In commenting on these cases, Professor Battifol pointed out that
these decisions represented extensions of an existing policy in some
French cases to treat international contracts specially and to create
exceptions from those general rules that were designed primarily to
cover purely internal business agreements.39 What was most important was the recognition by the court that fairness in international
dealings made it essential to treat the rule invalidating arbitration
agreements for government-owned enterprises as purely an internal
rule in order to meet the needs of international commercial dealings.
In reaching this decision, the court stepped outside the explicit rules
in the French Code to create a judicial exception for international
commercial contracts, based on the needs of international commerce.4" In Zapata, the language used by the Court to express its
rationale leaves no doubt that it intended its holding to apply equally
to all international transactions. No part of the Court's rationale is
applicable by force of reason, or by judicial limitation, solely to
maritime contracts. The reasons given in support of validating the
38. Quoted in Battifol, supra note 35, at 34.
39. Battifol, supra note 35, at 38.
40. Id.
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forum-selection clause apply equally to all international transactions.
To read the Court's opinion as applying only to admiralty or maritime
cases is to deny the force of the reasoning that supports it.
The rule that Zapata imposes is one that should be binding in
federal and state courts alike, at least for international contracts.
There is no indication in the Erie case, nor in any of the decisions
clarifying it, that it was intended to make state law authoritative
on matters that affect the interests and powers of the federal
government when those matters require the application of uniform
national value judgments rather than the localized value perceptions of
state decision-makers. 4 It is clear from the opinion in Zapata that the
validity of forum-selection clauses in international contracts is viewed
by the Supreme Court as a matter affecting important national
interests. The federal interest in the effective conduct of foreign
commerce is self-evident, and the perceptions of the importance of
foreign commerce and the relationship of the forum-selection clause
to the effectiveness of its conduct is a principal emphasis of the
Zapata opinion. In view of the endorsement of this evaluation by the
Supreme Court, it is clearly inappropriate to subject a forum-selection
clause in any international contract to diverse state practice and
assessment of its enforceability. The limited political context in which
the state decision-maker operates is an inappropriate one in which to
make a policy judgment concerning the importance of effective forum
selection by the parties to international commercial dealings. Also, the
pertinent information that must be weighed to determine the wisdom
of giving effect to the clause is unavailable to the state decision-maker,
or, if actually available, will not necessarily be perceived as sufficiently
important to override the competence of state courts unless the court
is forced to view that information from a national perspective by
means of a rule of federal common law. Lastly, any adverse effects
that may be experienced in international commercial dealings because
of lack of predictability created by a diversity of rules on the validity
of forum-selection clauses will impinge on the nation as a whole, not
solely on those states that might decide to refuse enforcement.42 It is
true that the above analysis is based on what is, in the strict sense,
dicta in the Zapata opinion. Nonetheless, this writer believes that the
impact of that case clearly was intended to go beyond the framework
of admiralty and maritime law to create a federal common law rule,
binding on federal and state courts alike in all international cases in
41. See United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 332 U.S. 301, 307
(1947).
42. For a discussion of the three tests that underlie this analysis see Maier,
supra note 14, at 168-73.
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which a reasonable forum selection clause is sought to be enforced.4"
The last remaining question with which this comment will deal
concerns the extent to which the Zapata decision announces a federal
common law rule, binding not only in cases involving international
transactions, but in all cases arising in interstate or international
commerce. Unlike the question of the applicability of the holding of
the case to international contracts, the Supreme Court's opinion
contains only a slight hint that it considered the rule it announced one
that might be applicable to all forum-selection clauses in contracts
falling under federal jurisdiction. In justifying its decision as applied to
federal courts sitting in admiralty, the Court said that the rule it
adopted in Zapata was "merely the other side of the proposition
recognized ... in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent
....
,44 The Court quoted a portion of the Szukhent opinion:
[I] t is settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit
to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice
to be served by the
45
opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether.
Szukhent involved a New York federal district court suit in which the
Michigan defendants had agreed, in a form contract, to accept service
-f process through a designated agent in New York State. The
Supreme Court held that, as long as actual notice of the pending suit
was given, the designation by private contract of an agent to receive
service was permitted under Rule 4(d)(1), Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 46 Justice Black, dissenting, pointed out that this amounted to the creation of a rule applicable only in federal courts since
there was no other rule that would require a person who could not
constitutionally be compelled to submit to a state court's jurisdiction
to appear in compliance with such an agreement. To the extent that
the reference to Szukhent in Zapata can be taken as more than obiter
dicta, it could at least imply that the validation of forum-selection
43. If this analysis is correct, the case would have one important side effect.
Among the reasons given by the United States delegation to the Tenth Session of
the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 1964 for the United States
absention in the vote on the Hague Convention on the Choice of Court was that
"the effect to be given choice of forum provisions is a matter that traditionally
lies within the control of the States and there is no compelling reason why the
national government should enter the area." 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 265, 271
(1965). The report, however, mentions several other reasons that justified the
United States abstention.
44. 407 U.S. at 10.
45. 407 U.S. at 11 (quoting from National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964)).
46. Rule 4(d)(1) states that service may be made "[u]pon an individual other
than an infant or an incompetent person, by delivering a copy of the summons
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clauses will be treated as a rule of federal courts law, applicable only
in federal forums. Such a result could clearly be reached by the same
kind of judicial interpretation applied in Szukhent. The Zapata rule
could be treated as a federal standard, promulgated as a logical
extension of the existing case law under Federal Rule 4(d)(1). To read
such an extension into the holding in Zapata as a statement of existing
law appears to be going a bit too far. On the other hand, since most
suits involving interstate contracts would qualify for diversity jurisdiction, such a holding in a later case might be one way for the court
to create a de facto national rule validating reasonable forum-selection
clauses in all commercial contracts, without wrestling with the more
difficult problem of justifying a sufficient federal interest to support
the creation of a rule of federal common law applicable in all domestic
cases in both federal and state forums.
When Zapata is read together with Prima Paint,4 7 it becomes clear
that the Supreme Court, in a future case, could find effective
reasoning to support on the basis of overriding federal policy the
validation of forum-selection clauses in all contracts "arising in
commerce." As indicated above, the Prima Paint decision amounts to
the announcement of a strong federal policy in support of the federal
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate that fall within the scope of
the United States Arbitration Act. That Act clearly relates to both
interstate and foreign commerce.4" When that decision is read
together with Zapata one conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is
that all agreements to arbitrate as well as all reasonable selections of
forums in international commercial contracts will be enforced in the
federal courts. One commentator suggests that regardless of the scope
given to the Zapata opinion itself, its effect will be to eliminate refusal
to enforce choice-of-forum clauses through a combination of the
power of the Supreme Court's reasoning and the fact that most cases
of this nature are brought in the federal courts.4 9 If this in fact
becomes the result, it will represent no mean accomplishment for the
common law powers of the federal courts.
and of the complaint to him personally or by leaving copies thereof at his dwelling
house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint
to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process."
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
47. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
48. Some sponsors of the bill to enact the Arbitration Act indicated that they
had three goals in urging its passage: to get a state statute, to get a federal law to
cover interstate and foreign commerce and admiralty, and to get a treaty with
foreign countries covering arbitration agreements. See 388 U.S. at 405 n.13.
49. See Juenger, Supreme Court Validation of Forum-Selection Clauses, 19
WAYNE

L. REV. 49, 59-60 (1972).
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